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In the last 20 years, numerous studies have supported Terror Management 
Theory’s prediction that reminding individuals of their own mortality increases negativ  
bias toward members of other ethnic/racial groups (TMT; Greenberg, Schimel, Martens, 
Solomon, & Pyszcznyski, 2001; Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Nelson, 
Moore, Olivetti, Scott, 1997). According to TMT, culture provides a death anxiety buffer 
and self-esteem. When people are reminded of their mortality they react by having a 
stronger preference for their culture and others who share their worldview. Reminders of 
mortality also cause individuals to show more disdain for people who do not share their 
worldview (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Solomon, Greenberg, & 
Pyszczynski, 1991; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Solomon, Greenberg, & 
Pyszczynski, 2004). Reminders of mortality lead to individuals being more likely to 
exhibit several changes in attitudes and behaviors including a stronger intergroup bias. 
Possibly one of the deadliest consequences of intergroup bias occurs when police officers 
misidentify a harmless object as something dangerous. Previous research has shown that 
individuals are more likely to misperceive a picture of a hand tool as a weapon (i.e., 




Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002). The purpose of the present research is to investigate 
the possibility that individuals will have a stronger weapon bias after being remind d of 
their mortality. 
TMT is based on the writings of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (1973). 
Becker stated that humans are similar to all other animals in that they have a biological 
predisposition for survival. The core difference between humans and the rest of the 
animal kingdom is that humans have the cognitive capabilities to realize that they will die 
and this realization causes a deep anxiety. To alleviate this anxiety, humans invest in a 
shared cultural conception of reality or a cultural worldview. These worldviews not only 
answer existential questions, such as where did we come from and what should we do, 
but they also provide self-esteem, which buffers the anxiety of mortality. Cultural 
worldviews also provide an avenue to immortality. By meeting or exceeded the deman s 
of the culture (i.e. high self-esteem), humans can achieve a literal immortality as with 
religion, or a symbolic immortality. Symbolic immortality can be achieved by 
contributing to a meaningful society in such a way that will continue after the individual 
has died. In either case, thoughts of death are pushed to the back of the mind. 
To test the theory, the first TMT experiment primed judges with thoughts of their 
mortality (mortal salience, MS; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynki, & Lyon 
1989). The judges were assigned to either the MS condition or the control condition. 
Judges in the MS condition responded to two essays regarding their mortality, while 
judges in the control condition did not respond to any essay questions. All judges then 
read a case file of an alleged prostitute and were asked to recommend the bond amount. 
According to the theory, judges that had been reminded of their mortality should set a 
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higher bond amount because of a stronger need to punish someone that violates cultural 
norms. The data supported the theory as judges in the MS condition had a mean bond of 
$455 while judges in the control condition set a mean bond of $50 (Rosenblatt et al., 
1989).  
The MS condition most typically used in TMT experiments is having participants 
write two essays about their mortality (Rosenblatt, et al., 1989). The control group is 
typically asked to write essays regarding something not related to mortality such as 
taking a difficult exam or dental pain. While writing essays is the usual method to 
operationalize MS, participating in a survey next to a funeral home (Pyszczynski et al., 
1996), watching fatal accident footage (Nelson et al., 1997), and having the word “death” 
flashed outside of the participants’ conscious awareness (Arndt, Allen, & Greenbeg, 
2001) have also been used.  
According to TMT, one of the functions of culture is to keep the reality of death 
in the peripheral, so when mortality is brought to the forefront of the mind, several varied
behaviors have been shown. Participants are more likely to become aggressive, 
(McGregor et al., 1998), they have larger responses to phobias and compulsive behavior 
(Strachan et al., 2007), and they are less likely to use of cultural symbols such as flags or
crosses to complete a task (Greenberg, Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1995). 
They are also more likely to set higher bonds for those that violate cultural values 
(Rosenblatt et al., 1989), place attributions of blame on severely injured victims 
(Hirschberger, 2006), and are more desirous for offspring (Wisman & Goldenberg, 
2005). After the MS condition, women restricted their eating (Goldenberg, Arndt, Hart, 
& Brown, 2005), and participants made an exaggerated consensus estimate (Pyszczynski 
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et al., 1996). TMT research usually shows the negative impacts of the MS condition, but 
there are some instances where participants showed an increase in positive attitudes. 
After the MS condition, mildly depressed people thought that the world had more 
meaning (Simon, Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1998) and people were 
more likely to support charities (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002)
although, the charities supported were in-group charities. 
Thus far, one of the strongest effects of the MS condition is in intergroup bias. In 
Greenberg et al. (2001) white participants were more likely to sympathize with a white 
racist, and they also gave a shorter prison sentence to a white employer guilty of 
discrimination against a Black man. After the MS manipulation, Christians had a higher 
evaluation of other Christians than they did of Jews and Anti-American essays were 
disliked more (Greenberg et al., 1990). Participants were more likely to blame a Japanese 
car maker than an American car maker for a vehicle crash after the MS condition, and 
were more likely to blame the company if it was a Japanese company than they were to 
blame the driver (Nelson et al., 1997). After MS, Italians were more likely to have a 
negative view of Germans (Castano et al., 2002), men were less receptive to pro-women 
courses at a university (Fritsche, & Jonas, 2005), younger people were more likely to 
distance themselves from older people (Martens, Greenberg, Schimel, & Landau, 2004), 
and participants were more likely to show bias in a minimal group setting (Harmon-
Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996). The MS condition has also shown that 
Iranian participants were more supportive of suicide bombers that attack the United
States and American participants were more supportive of attacks that could kill 
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thousands of civilians in foreign countries (Pyszczynski, Abdollahi, Solomon, Greenberg, 
Cohen, & Weise, 2006). 
Typically, TMT studies have relied on explicit measures to investigate intergroup 
bias. Explicit measurements of bias consist of asking the participant to respond to a direct 
question. An example of an explicit question from the Old Fashioned Racism Scale reads, 
“Black people are generally not as smart as whites,” (McConahay, 1986). TMT studies 
usually remind the participant of their mortality and then ask the participant to rate an 
out-group target. For instance, in Greenberg et al. (1990), Christian participants were 
reminded of their mortality and asked to read a profile of a Jewish person and then asked 
to respond to questions about the Jewish person’s intelligence and if they would enjoy 
working with the Jewish person. While these questions are more indirect and subtle than 
the Old Fashioned Racism Scale, they do give the participant the opportunity to make a 
controlled, deliberate decision.  
Recent evidence has shown that not only does explicit bias increase after MS, but 
also implicit bias. While there are differences of opinion of what constitutes implicit 
(Fazio & Olson, 2003), for the purposes of this document, implicit should be understood 
as automatic or spontaneous responses that do not allow the participant time for 
introspection. One of the most widely used measures of implicit bias is the Implicit 
Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT measur s 
automatic associations. For example, individuals are able to associate “flower” and 
“pleasant” quicker than they can associate “insect” and “pleasant.” Previous research has 
shown that White participants can associate a name generally considered to be White 
with a pleasant word faster than they can associate a Black name with a pleasant word 
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because there is a stronger associate strength between White and pleasant than there is 
with Black and pleasant. In a recent study, participants had a larger effect on the Implicit 
Association Test after being reminded of their mortality. Participants in the MS condition 
took longer to sort stereotypical Black names and pleasant words together when 
compared to the control group (Bradley, Kennison, Burke, & Chaney, 2010).  
The purpose of the present research is to investigate the hypothesis that 
individuals will be more likely to make mistakes when race and time are factors. Police 
officers are often required to make split-second decisions about who is carrying  weapon 
and who is not. Previous studies have shown that when a person has to make a quick 
decision on whether or not something is a weapon, the color of the person can influence 
the judgment. In Payne (2001), participants were first shown a picture of a Black face or 
a White face and then a picture of a hand tool or a gun. When participants were forced to 
make quick decisions, they were more likely to misidentify a tool as a gun if it was 
preceded by a Black face. A similar study showed that if participant’s were instructed to 
racially profile (use the picture of the face as a basis as to whether the scond picture was 
a tool or a gun) weapon bias increased. Weapon bias also increased if they were told to 
intentionally avoid using race as a determinant which suggests that by reminding 
participants of race in any capacity, weapon bias increases (Payne et al., 2002). A similar 
experiment showed pictures of White or Black men holding various objects (Correll, 
Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). In some of the pictures the men were holding 
innocuous objects (e.g., cell phone, bottles) and in some of the pictures the men were 
holding guns. Participants were instructed to press the “shoot” button if the man was 
armed and the “not shoot” if the man was unarmed. As with the previous research, 
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participants were more likely to incorrectly “shoot” the men if the men were Black. There 
is also evidence that event related brain potentials are different among participants with a 
higher rate of weapon bias (Correll, Urland, & Ito, 2006). 
Weapon bias studies attempt to explain why the tragic deaths of Sean Bell, who 
was shot at 50 times by police officers because of an incorrect assumption there was a 
gun in his vehicle (Rashbaum & Baker, 2006), and the killing of Amadou Diallo, who 
was shot at 41 times after reaching into his pocket for his wallet (Barry & Waldman, 
2000), occur. There is at least one difference between the lab setting of weapon bias 
research and the actual situation that police officers face. Police officrs are constantly 
reminded of death. They are shot at, they witness dead bodies, and they hear auditory 
cues such as “Officer down.” In fact, one of the officers in the Diallo shooting remarked 
that he was afraid for his life. 
In the present experiment, we tested the hypothesis that individuals would 
perform worse on tasks that involve mortality and race and that require quick responses. 
The present research aims to replicate previous weapon bias studies with the addition of 
MS. In the present experiment, participants were randomly assigned to either rspond to 
the MS essays or control essays. Each participant then completed the weapon bias task. It 
is possible that MS will affect the individual’s automatic perceptions of whatis a 
weapon. It was predicted that participants in the MS condition would have an increase in 
errors on the weapon bias task when compared to participants in the control condition.  It 
was specifically predicted that individuals in the MS condition would be more likelyto 









Participants. 88 (45 female, 43 male) undergraduates who were enrolled in 
psychology classes at Oklahoma State University took part in the experiment. All 
participants were White and born in the United States.  
 Materials and Procedure. All participants first completed a survey containing 
questions regarding demographics and self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965). Participants were 
then randomly assigned to either the control or the MS condition. Participants in the MS 
condition responded to the two open ended questions of “Please briefly describe the 
emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you” and to “Jot down as 
specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die, and 
once you are physically dead” (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Participants in the control
condition responded to the two following questions: “Please briefly describe the emotions 
that the thought of your next exam arouses in you” and to “Jot down as specifically as 
you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically take your next exam, and 
once you are physically taking your next exam” which have been used as the control 




All participants then completed the weapon bias procedure. Participants were first 
presented with a picture of a face which is the prime stimuli. A total of 24 pictures were 
used as primes which included 12 pictures of White individuals and 12 pictures of Black 
individuals. The prime pictures remained on the screen for 200 ms. Participants were then 
presented with the target stimuli. A total of 12 pictures were used for the target stimuli 
which included 8 pictures of hand tools and 8 pictures of guns. The target pictures 
remained on the screen for 100 ms. The computer screen then displayed a visual mask 
and the participants made the decision on whether they saw a gun or a tool. The exact 
instructions given to the participant was as follows: 
The next task measures speed and accuracy in responding under 
distracting conditions.  You will see two pictures flashed quickly on 
screen, one after the other.  The first picture will always be a face.  Don’t 
do anything in response to the face.  This face signals that the second 
picture is about to appear.  Classify the second picture as either a gun or a 
tool.  Press “P” if it is a gun, press “Q” if it is a tool. 
 
 All participants received 4 practice trials during which they had 800 ms to 
respond. During the first critical block, participants were presented with 64 trials in 
which they had 700 ms to respond. During the final critical block, participants were 
presented with 64 trials in which they had 200 ms to respond. If a participant did not 
respond within the time limit for each trial, a series of red X’s appeared on the screen for 
1 s and participants were reminded to make their decision within the time limit. There 
was a 500 ms delay between trials. The use of these response times is congruent with 
previous weapon bias research.  
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 Experimental Design. A 2 (MS/Control) X 2 (prime type) X 2 (object type) X 2 
(Deadline) mixed design was used. The between subjects variable was MS/Control.  All 










As predicted, participants in the mortality salience condition exhibited greater 
weapon bias than participants in the control condition.  Mean error rates were computed 
for each participant for each of the pairings (White/Tool, White/Gun, Black/Tool, 
Black/Gun).  Mean error rates were analyzed using analysis of variance (ANOVAs).  The 
means are displayed in Table 1.   
Error rates were collapsed across deadlines for the analysis.  A 2 (prime type) x 2 
(object type) x 2 (condition) revealed a main effect for MS, F(1 86) = 4.57, p = .03, η2 = 
.05, revealing that participants in the MS condition had a higher error rate for all pairings 
combined on the weapon bias task (M = .24) compared to participants in the control 
condition (M = .20).  The analysis also revealed an interaction between prime type and 
object type, F(1, 86) = 8.78, p = .004, η2 = .09.  Simple comparisons between each 
individual pairing only the predicted pairing (Black/Tool) was significantly higher in the 
MS condition when compared to the control condition, F(1, 86) = 4.07, p = .05, η2 = .05.  
Participants in the MS condition also significantly misidentified Black/Tool significantly 
more than White/Tool, F(1, 41) = 4.95, p = .03, η2 = .11.  Figure 1 displays mean error 
rates by condition.  
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To further explore the results a signal detection analysis was conducted (Gre n & 
Swets, 1966; MacMillan & Creelman, 2005).  A signal detection analysis produces a 
value for d’ and a value for the decision criterion.  The value for d’ represents how 
accurate an individual is at differentiating between threatening targets and nonthreatening 
targets.  It is computed by taking a z transformation of the hit rate, or the correct 
identification of a gun, minus the z transformation of false alarms, or the 
misidentification of a gun.  The equation for d’ is written d’ = z(H) – z(F).  The value for 
the decision criterion reflects what the threshold is for determining whether or not an 
object is threatening.  For example, if an individual sets a low decision criterion fo  
threatening targets they will be likely to produce more false alarms which would reflect 
in error rates. The equation for the decision criterion is written c = -1/2[z(H) + z(F)].  
Using a signal detection theory analysis it was also found that individuals in the MS 
condition set a lower threshold for dangerous objects when the object was preceded by a 
picture of a Black individual.   
The signal detection analysis only had significant findings in the first block with 
the deadline of 700 ms.  An ANOVA was conducted on the values for d’ and revealed a 
main effect for MS.  Participants in the MS condition had significantly smaller va ues for 
d’ (M = 2.52) compared to the control group (M = 2.91), F(1, 86) = 5.22, p = .03, η2 = 
.06, showing that participants in the MS condition were less able to differentiate betw en 
threatening and non-threatening objects.  Simple comparisons were conducted and 
revealed that individuals in the MS condition had a significantly lower d’ for White 
primes (M = 2.44) than control group participants (M = 2.86), F(1, 86)  = 5.54, p = .02, η2 
= .06.  Individuals in the MS condition also had a smaller d’ for Black primes (M = 2.59) 
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than individuals in the control condition (M = 2.96).  This difference was marginally 
significant, F(1, 86)  = 3.54, p = .06, η2 = .04.  Mean d’ are displayed in Figure 2 by 
prime type and condition. 
Analysis of the decision criterion revealed a significant interaction between the 
decision criterion and condition, F(1,86) = 3.93, p = .05, η2 = .04.  This interaction is 
displayed in Figure 3.  Simple comparisons revealed a marginally significant difference 
within the MS condition between the decision criterion for White primes and Black 
primes, F(1,41) = 3.73, p = .06, η2 = .08. This shows that individuals in the MS condition 
were more likely to set a lower decision criterion for dangerous objects if the object had 
been preceded by a picture of a Black individual.  Also of note is that decision criterion 
for both White and Black primes in both conditions is below zero.  This shows that 
participants as a whole were more likely to misidentify non-threatening objects than 













Previous weapon bias research has shown that individuals are more likely to 
misidentify harmless objects as dangerous objects when that object is associated with a 
picture a Black individual (Payne, 2001; Payne, et al., 2002).  Additionally, previous 
TMT research has shown that intergroup bias increases after individuals are reminded of 
their mortality (Greenberg, et al., 2001; Castano, et al., 2002; Nelson, et al., 1997).  
Because of the effects of MS on intergroup bias it was predicted that participan s that had 
been reminded of their mortality would exhibit a stronger weapon bias.   
The results revealed several significant findings.  Most congruent with the 
hypothesis was the result that MS did significantly increase error rates on the task 
compared to the control group.  Participants in the MS condition had the highest error 
rates for the pairing of a tool with a picture of a Black individual reflecting a pattern of 
weapon bias.  A signal detection theory analysis (Green & Swets, 1966; MacMillan & 
Creelman, 2005) also revealed that participants in the MS condition had a more difficult 
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time differentiating between threatening objects and non-threatening objects  compared to 
control group participants.  This analysis also revealed that participants in the MS 
condition had a more difficult time differentiating between threatening objects and non-
threatening objects  compared to control group participants.  This analysis also revealed 
that participants in the MS condition set a lower threshold for threatening objects if the 
object was preceded by a picture of a Black individual. 
These results have the potential to provide insight into real-world 
misidentifications of non-threatening objects as threatening objects at times when 
thoughts of mortality are high. Because MS did have an effect on the error rates it may 
provide insight into why incidents like the tragic death of Sean Bell occur. These results 
may be among the first to explain why individuals who are placed in dangerous situations 
may be more likely to exhibit racial prejudice when mortality is salient and time is an 
issue. By better understanding the underlying processes that lead to this increa ed bias, 
future researchers may be able to find ways to help reduce bias in these circumstan es. 
For example, future research may lead to the development of interventions designed to 
reduce bias that can be delivered to individuals who are placed in dangerous situations 
such as police officers and soldiers.   
The results revealed that MS caused an increase in error rates for both stereotype 
compatible and incompatible pairings. The increase for stereotype incompatible was 
more pronounced reflecting a pattern of increased weapon bias.  The increase in the 
compatible pairings was somewhat unexpected but is a phenomenon worth further 
investigation.  It is possible that this increase can provide insight into more than just 
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weapon bias against out-group members.  For example, in areas of the world where 
thoughts of mortality are high, an increase in the misperception of threatening objects 
regardless of race could provide insight into phenomenon such as death by friendly fire. 
The analysis of the decision criterion also showed an interesting effect.  After MS 
participants lowered their threshold for dangerous objects if that object was preceded by a 
picture of a Black individual.  Participants in both conditions regardless of racial prime
showed a preference to misidentify tools more than guns.  The present research and 
previous weapon bias research has been conducted in areas of the country that are 
considered southern states.  A possible reason for a preference to misidentify 
nonthreatening objects is that the participants in this area of the country may be ore 
“trigger happy” than in other parts of the country.  This effect could be related to the
research into culture of honor that states that individuals from southern states have a 
stronger disposition towards violence (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).  Future research could be 
conducted that investigates if participants in this area of the country do have significantly 
higher false alarm rates compared to other areas of the country.  Additionally t could be 
investigated if individuals from southern states are more likely to respond to thoughts of 
mortality with violence. An interesting example of the underlying cultural influence of 
violence for participants in the present research is that their mascot is a gun linger. 
Future research may also further investigate ways to minimize the intergroup bias 
effects of MS especially for people that are in situations that call for quick decisions 
when threats of mortality are high. Studies have shown that the negative effects o  MS 
can be decreased in an experimental setting by priming tolerance (for review see Niesta, 
Fritsche, & Jonas, 2008). Also weapon bias has been reduced through training in an 
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experimental setting.  Participants that completed the weapon bias task on several 
occasions saw a reduction in bias towards Black individuals (Correll, Park, Judd, 
Wittenbrink, Sadler, & Keesee, 2007).  Although it has not been investigated if this type 
of training would reflect in real world settings.  Previous research has also shown that 
implicit racism can be reduced by having individuals imagine a counter-stereotypical 
person (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001).  Unfortunately after reminders of mortality 
individuals prefer a stereotype confirming image of an outgroup member (Schimel et al., 
1999). So for future research to be effective in real world settings, such as the life or 
death situations experienced by police officers and soldiers, not only will it be necessary 
to lessen stereotypical responses, the future research must also include effective ways of 
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Mean Error Rates by Prime, Target, Condition, and Deadline 
Deadlines Combined 
 
Black    White 
 
Tool  Gun  Tool  Gun 
 
MS  .29 (.02) .20 (.02) .25 (.02) .23 (.02) 
Control .23 (.02) .16 (.02) .23 (.02) .18 (.02) 
 
Deadline 200ms 
Black    White 
 
Tool  Gun  Tool  Gun 
 
MS  .41 (.03) .30 (.02) .36 (.03) .32 (.03) 





Black    White 
 
Tool  Gun  Tool  Gun 
 
MS  .16 (.02) .10 (.02) .14 (.02) .13 (.02) 
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Scope and Method of Study: The research tested the hypothesis that reminding 
individuals of their mortality would increase weapon bias as predicted by terror 
management theory (TMT, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). Prior 
research has shown that mortality salience increases both explicit prejudice (i.e. 
self-report questionnaires) and implicit bias (Bradley & Kennison, 2009). In this 
experiment, participants were randomly assigned to either describe the emotions 
that the thought of their own death aroused in them (mortality salience, MS) or to 
describe their feelings toward an upcoming exam (control). All participants then 
completed a computer task where a picture of a White individual or a picture of a 
Black individual was flashed. This picture was followed by a picture of a hand 
tool or of a weapon. This task is referred to as the weapon bias task. Previous 
research has shown that individuals are more likely to misidentify a hand tool as a 
weapon when it is preceded by a picture of a Black (versus White) individual.  
 
Findings and Conclusions:  Participants that had been reminded of their mortality had 
higher error rates on the weapon bias task than participants in the control 
condition.  An interaction was also found between the Primes (White/Black) and 
Targets (Tool/Gun).  Exploring this interaction revealed that participants were 
more likely to misidentify a tool as a gun if that target had been preceded by a 
picture of a Black individual.  Further exploration of the results revealed that this 
difference was significant for the MS condition.  Participants that had been 
reminded of their mortality had an increase in weapon bias when compared to the 
control group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
